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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
but did not select a third, then the latter might be appointed
by the senior judge of the Fifth Federal Judicial Circuit. It was
held that since no new act of volition was required by the
parties with respect to the fixing of the price, the agreement
was binding and could not be disregarded. The decision appears
to be a sound reflection of recognized civilian principles and is
also harmonious with the modern liberal approach reflected in
the Uniform Commercial Code. 9 It seems very clear that the
parties did intend to bind themselves and were meticulous in
trying to avoid the rule that nullifies a projected sale where the
price is left to be fixed by arbitrators to be chosen by the parties




Negligence as Balancing Process
Occasionally the facts of a controversy invite a sharp focus
upon the essential balancing process that lies at the heart of
negligence. Conduct involving a chance of injury should be char-
acterized as negligent conduct whenever the chance is found to
be unreasonable. Ordinarily "big" chances are more likely to be
regarded as unreasonable than are "little" chances. But even a
very small chance involving only a remote possibility of causing
injury may be recognized as unreasonable, and hence negligent,
if it is a "useless" chance-that is to say, if nothing worth-
while is to be gained by taking it.' Particularly is this true when,
in addition, the risk is of such a nature that the consequences
would be highly serious if it should materialize. The case that
suggested all this ruminating is Allien v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co. 2 The conduct involved was the maintenance by de-
fendant of an uninsulated high voltage electric line at a height
of twenty-eight feet above the surface and at a distance of
twenty-six feet from an abandoned oil well. The picture thus
presented was not one of obvious danger, and there was little
likelihood of injury to anyone on the ground in the absence of
some rare circumstance. Such an unexpected situation did arise,
however, when operators of an oil rig mounted on a truck at-
9. Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-305.
* Boyd Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See the excellent discussion in Terry, Negligence, 29 HAv. L. REv. 40
(1915).
2. 202 So.2d 704 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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tempted to raise the rig to its full height of thiry-five feet.
Contact with the line resulted, and the deceased, a bystander,
was electrocuted through contact with a guy wire supporting
the mast of the rig.
The considerable height of the wire and the remoteness of the
location would both suggest that the likelihood of injury was too
small to justify a finding of negligence on the part of the electric
installer. Plaintiff's counsel, however, emphasized the fact that
the initial installation of the pole and wire in question was due
to a mistake as to its proper location. It was shown that upon
discovery of the mistake the transformers were moved, but the
highly energized uninsulated wire was left in place as a useless
appendage extending a distance of 185 feet leading to no destina-
tion. It was this wire with which the fatal contact was made. The
court observed that although the possibility of danger was slight,
the justification for maintaining the condition was negligible,
particularly in view of the fact that the risk involved exposure to
a lethal charge of nearly 14,000 volts.
Duty to Emotionally Unstable Employee
Because of the infrequency of negligence claims by employees
against their own employers we are tempted to lose sight of the
fact that a substantial range of non-statutory duties are owed the
servant by his master. Although the most familiar of these is the
obligation to furnish a reasonably safe place to work, and to sup-
ply adequate tools,3 the employer is equally under a duty to avoid
assigning to an employee a work task that is so beyond his com-
petence that it involves a serious risk of injury. The assigned job
may require more physical strength or more skill and training
than the employee possesses. 4 Recently the Court of Appeal for
the First Circuit recognized that the employer is under a similar
duty to refrain from exposing the employee to stresses which he
is aware may be harmful to the worker's mental or emotional
welfare. In Sampson v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. 5
the employee complained that his employer assigned him in-
tricate, complicated, and confusing tasks while fully informed of
plaintiff's precarious mental condition and in contravention of
advice from the employee's physician. The details of the alleged
negligence were not fully presented because the trial court held
3. See W. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW & PRACTICE
Ch. 1, § 2 (1951).
4. Myhan v. Louisiana Light & Power Co., 41 La. Ann. 964, 6 So. 799 (1889)
James v. Rapides Lumber Co., 50 La. Ann. 717, 23 So. 469 (1898).
5. 205 So.2d 496 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
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that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act G precluded the maintenance of a tort action against the
employer. The court of appeal reversed this holding and re-
manded the controversy for the presentation of the facts on
which the wrongdoing was allegedly based. The court's position
is clearly correct in principle. No arbitrary distinction should
exist between negligence affecting physical strain and negligence
that threatens to bring about disabling mental and emotional
stress. The result in either event can be an incapacitated worker.
It is to be anticipated that in claims of this nature there are cer-
tain to arise puzzling questions of assumption of risk, causation,
and possibly contributory negligence; but this prospect need not
serve to defeat recovery arbitrarily.
Illegal Sale of Ammunition to Minor
A recent decision by the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Cir-
cuit has announced that a merchant selling shotgun shells to
fourteen-year old children is not responsible for the subsequent
accidental shooting of one such child by the other.7 The claim
was based upon violation of a criminal statute condemning the
sale of "any firearm or other instrumentality customarily used
as a dangerous weapon" to anyone under the age of twenty one
years.8 The court rejected the criminal statute as the basis of
liability because the sale in the instant case was of ammunition
for firearms, rather than the sale of the weapons themselves. The
court also dismissed the plaintiff's claim of liability based on
negligence which might arise irrespective of the terms of the
criminal statute. Insofar as liability existing independent of the
statute is concerned, the court's action in dismissing the claim
follows the pattern in other jurisdictions. Liability has seldom
been imposed when the purchaser was as old as fourteen years.8
The question as to whether or not the criminal statute should be
completely ignored (despite the fact that it was not literally ap-
plicable) is more difficult. In this connection it is interesting to
note that the criminal statute in question, imposing an unqual-
ified prohibition of the sale of firearms, appears in that division
of the Criminal Code dealing with offenses affecting the health
and morals of minors. It is significant that the sale of firearms
and the sale of intoxicating liquors are prohibited in the same
sentence. It appears likely that the statute was directed against
6. LA. R.S. 23:1032 (1950).
7. Schmit v. Guidry, 204 So.2d 646 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
8. LA. R.S. 14:91 (1950).
9. Liability for sale to children up through 12 years is frequent; see Annot.,
20 A.L.R.2d 119 (1951).
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the risk of intentional violence and affrays between minors
rather than the risk of purely accidental shootings. For this
reason the court was justified in rejecting any analogy to the
criminal provision.
Responsibility for Negligence of Nurses
The established Louisiana position that the tort immunity
enjoyed by a charitable institution is not available to its liability
insurerlo has obliged our courts on several occasions to scrutinize
sharply situations where alleged misconduct of a nurse or other
skilled attendant forms the basis of a personal injury claim by
a patient. If the act or omission in question is one for which the
employer hospital could be held under respondeat superior, then
the hospital's only defense is its charitable immunity, which is
personal to the institution itself. If, on the other hand, at the
time of the accident the nurse or attendant is to be regarded as
something akin to an independent contractor performing profes-
sional services of a skilled character, rather than merely follow-
ing hospital directions, then there is no basis for any hospital
liability. Nothing short of careless selection could ground hospital
responsibility under these circumstances. The nurse is merely
an independent expert whose services are made available to the
patient by the institution. This complete absence of a cause of
action is available, of course, to the liability insurer as well."
A further distinction closely allied to the above concerns the
relationship between the nurse, the attending surgeon or physi-
cian, and the hospital. Here the borrowed servant doctrine enters
to complicate the picture, for the nurse's task that results in in-
jury may be non-professional, non-skilled, and one that normally
would subject the hospital to liability, yet she may be perform-
ing it under the exclusive direction of the surgeon or physician,
thus terminating for the time being her status as hospital servant
and shifting respondeat superior liability solely upon the sur-
geon for whom she was acting.
12
The necessity for resort to such distinctions arises whenever
10. Messina v. Societe Francaise De Bienfaissance, 170 So. 801 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1936).
11. As a practical matter, hospital liability insurers avoid responsibility in
the situation where the employee is acting as a skilled, independent contractor by
expressly excluding liability based on fault in rendering medical, surgical or nurs-
ing services (as opposed to merely "administrative" or non-skilled functions).
Such a clause was involved in the case under discussion here, Grant v. Touro In-
firmary, 207 So.2d 235 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
12. Jordan v. Touro Infirmary, 123 So. 726 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1922)
Messina v. Societe Francaise De Bienfaissance, 170 So. 801 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1936).
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a gauze memento is left in the body of a patient following surgery.
The established procedure with reference to surgical sponges is
a coordinated counting operation executed by two nurses. If the
counts fail to tally, the surgeon is notified and a hunting expedi-
tion is initiated. Otherwise the surgeon customarily satisfies
himself by confirming the tally of the nurses' counts. Several
Louisiana decisions confirm the proposition that proof of the
unexpected presence of the sponge following the operation jus-
tifies a finding that there was error in the count. 3 Since this
points the finger of responsibility toward the nurses, the ques-
tion arises, whose servants (if anyone's) were they at the time?
The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit recently held that
the counting of the sponges was not a professional act of such
character that the nurses should be considered as independent
contractors.14 For this reason their negligence was attributable to
the hospital, their employer. Although the hospital successfully
avoided personal liability by means of its plea of immunity, this
defense was not available to the charity's liability insurer.
In view of the fact that the nurses were regarded as agents
of the hospital, rather than of the presiding surgeon, the latter
could not be held responsible under respondeat superior. The
claim was made, however, that the presence of the sponge within
the patient's body indicated independent negligence on the part
of the surgeon. It was claimed that he was not relieved of the
duty of making a search into the abdominal cavity before closing
the incision. However, affirmative medical testimony offered on
behalf of the dependant surgeon indicated that reliance upon the
count of the nurses was the accepted practice followed by sur-
geons in the New Orleans community, where the operation took
place. Apparently this issue of the possible independent negli-
gence of the surgeon had been submitted to the jury at the trial
and it had found a verdict favorable to the defendant. 1" Under
these circumstances the affirmance of the judgment favorable
to the surgeon is expected. Chasez, J., dissented both from the
holding that the nurses were administrative agents of the hos-
pital rather than borrowed servants of the surgeon and also
from the affirmance of the verdict that there could be no in-
ference of personal negligence on the part of the surgeon. A writ
of certiorari has been granted by the Supreme Court.
13. Danks v. Maher, 177 So.2d 412 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
14. Grant v. Touro Infirmary, 207 So.2d 235 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
15. In some jurisdictions, proof of a professional custom to rely upon the
nurses' sponge count has not been determinative of the surgeon's negligence; e.g.,
Davis v. Kerr, 239 Pa. 351, 86 A. 1007 (1913).
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PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE
Res Ipsa Loquitur
The observation that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
readily available in situations where the plaintiff's injury arose
from a highly hazardous activity in which the defendant was
engaged 16 was reconfirmed in Tassin v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co.1 7 Plaintiff, an employee of a cotton gin, claimed that he was
blinded when a power line carrying a heavy load of electricity
suddenly fell without explanation, causing a blinding flash. The
defendant maintained that the falling of the line did not ex-
clude the reasonable possibility that the fall was caused by some
factors apart from defendant's negligence. The court pointed out
that it was not necessary that the plaintiff point to the precise
act or neglect to which the accident should be attributed. It is
sufficient, it observed, that the facts shown suggest that negli-
gence of the defendant, rather than other factors, is the most
plausible explanation of the accident.
In this case it seems not unlikely that the line fell because of
an overload of current at the time. For fifteen days prior to the
date of the accident there had been an average demand of power
highly in excess of the demand that was anticipated at the time
the line was completed. This suggests the question as to who has
the responsibility to maintain a going record of the amounts of
current required from time to time so as to determine the suit-
ability of the line to carry such increased load. When the case
was before the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit18 there was
a dissent by Justice Hood, who was apparently of the opinion that
the obligation of the power company to enlarge the capacity of
its line arises only after it has received affirmative notice from
the power user. The majority opinion would seem to indicate by
implication that it is a duty of the power company to maintain
a supervision of the quantity of power consumed and to make
the adjustments necessary under its own motion.
Loftin v. Travelers Ins. Co.19 presents a controversy of a type
that is becoming familiar in Louisiana. A customer in a large
self-service grocery store stepped in a puddle of clear water,
slipped and fell to the floor, sustaining injuries. The sole basis
16. See cases collected in Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference-
A Discussion of the Louisiana Cases, 4 LA. L. REv. 70, 95-97 (1941).
17. 250 La. 1016, 201 So.2d 275 (1967).
18. Tassin v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 191 So.2d 338 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1966). The appellate court's opinion was noted in 27 LA. L. REv. 853 (1967).
19. 208 So.2d 739 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
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for a claim of negligence was failure by the proprietor to inspect
the premises for dangerous conditions resulting from the conduct
of customers. A holding by the district court that the store's
inspection procedures were inadequate for an establishment as
large as this one was reversed on appeal. Detailed evidence was
introduced by the defendant concerning its inspection practices.
The sole basis of the difference of opinion between the majority
of the court of appeal and the dissenting Judge, Culpepper, was
the question of the extent of the duty of inspection owed by the
proprietor. 20 The facts were in no way disputed or in doubt.
There remained for the court only the policy question-were the
defendant's practices adequate to the need? The problem, how-
ever, was discussed by the majority as one involving res ipsa
loquitur. This attack probably resulted from the fact that it was
defendant, rather than plaintiff, that introduced the details of
the proprietor's inspection practices. The majority opinion sug-
gests that the trial court's conclusion that the practices of the
defendant were not reasonably adequate amounted to an applica-
tion of res ipsa loquitur and an improper casting of the burden of
disproving negligence on the defendant. It is difficult for this
writer to appreciate how the discussion of res ipsa loquitur
becomes relevant. Resort to this Latin phrase is usually appro-
priate when a court is seeking to determine whether an inference
of negligence can properly be drawn from the mere occurrence
of the accident. If, in the present controversy, no evidence of
defendant's practices had been introduced, the court might refer
to res ipsa loquitur in deciding what inference could be or could
not be, drawn. If it should determine that negligence cannot
properly be assumed from the plaintiff's spare showing, it might
appropriately add that the plaintiff has the task of proving her
case and that the burden was not upon the defendant to introduce
any evidence affirmatively exonerating himself. But once the
defendant has elected to describe his practices in the course of
the trial, as here, the only remaining task for the court is to ap-
praise these practices and give judgment for the plaintiff, or
refuse it, accordingly.
DUTY OF OCCUPIER OF PREMISES
Child Trespasser
The recent opinion in Duxworth v. Pat Caffee Contractor,
20. The dissenting opinion includes an excellent comment on the more exact-
ing duty of inspection owed by the proprietor of a large self-service grocery than
would be owed in a smaller establishment. Id. at 742-45.
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Inc.,21 is of particular interest because of its realistic approach to
the so-called "attractive nuisance" doctrine. A six and a half year
old boy suffered damages to his face and mouth while he was
playing underneath a heavy machine trailer which he and other
children were tilting in seesaw fashion. In allowing recovery the
court of appeal carefully pointed out that the question involved
was whether or not the defendant was negligent in its failure to
leave the device in a more secure position when it was aware of
the children in the vicinity of the machinery after working
hours. As factors bearing upon the issue of negligence, the court
pointed to the anticipated presence of children and the ease with
which the danger could have been reduced or obviated. The
court emphasized that a finding of "attractive nuisance" does
not obviate the essential character of the controversy as one in-
volving the presence or absence of negligence. 22 The fact that
the agency that inflicted the injury was an object which was
attractive to children is important primarily because in such
cases there is an increased likelihood of the presence of children
and consequently there is greater chance of injury. The opinion
is excellent and deserves careful study.
Social Guest
Ten years ago in Alexander v. General Ace. Fire & Life
Assur. Co.2 3 the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit broke
with the common law tradition and announced that a social guest
invited into defendant's residence was entitled to the same duty
of protection as is afforded a business guest. In 1965 the
Alexander decision was quoted with approval by the Court of
Appeal for the Fourth Circuit,2 4 and last year the Supreme
Court expressly approved the new approach.2 5 The Louisiana
courts are not alone in their rejection of the accepted common
law position with respect to the duty owed social guests. Very
recently the Supreme Court of California went even further and
21. 209 So.2d 497 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
22. For further discussion of this issue, see The Work of the Louisiana Ap-
pellate Courts for the 1964-1965 Term-Torts, 26 LA. L. REv. 510, 524-26 (1966).
23. 98 So.2d 730 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
24. Pampas v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 169 So.2d 200 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1964) (child burned by hot coffee when it pulled a coffee maker off a table
by its attached wire; claimed that grandparent was negligent in failure to antici-
pate the child's action; court approved the Alexander rule but found that grand-
parent was not negligent).
25. Foggin v. General Guar. Ins. Co., 250 La. 347, 195 So.2d 636 (1967).
(The defendant had nailed a plank across the gateway to his back yard to prevent
his dog from escaping. His mother visited on Thanksgiving and was not aware of
the presence of the plank, tripped on it, and was injured. The Supreme Court
followed the Alexander decision, announced the broad rule and allowed recovery
despite the claim of contributory negligence.)
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abandoned the entire traditional scheme whereby persons enter-
ing the premises of others are classified as trespassers, licensees,
or business guests and are accorded distinct duties appropriate
to their particular status.26 From now on, said the California
court, a general duty of reasonable care is owed to all, and the
question as to whether they are invited or uninvited, or whether
they come for pleasure or for profit, is important only as one
factor in fixing the demands of reasonable care in the par-
ticular case. This broad decision was prompted by a situation
involving an injury to a social guest.
Since it appears that a doctrinal revolution may fairly be
under way at least in the jurisdictions of California and Lou-
isiana and since it is a fairly safe conjecture that many other
jurisdictions will be tempted to follow suit, we might pause to
inquire as to what is the common law position that is threatened
with abandonment, and what are the changes being made by the
new decisions? As I understand the matter, the differences in
the duties owed the business guest and the licensee are twofold:
first, the business guest is entitled to assume in the absence of
a warning that the premises have been subjected to an inspection
and have been put into reasonably safe condition.27 The licensee or
social guest, on the other hand, cannot assume that any special
preparation has been made for his reception. He is, however, en-
titled to a warning of any unsafe condition of which the oc-
cupier is aware. 2 Furthermore, a dangerous condition is re-
garded as known to the occupier whenever he has become aware
of the raw observable facts themselves even though he has con-
cluded erroneously that the condition presents no potentiality of
danger.20 When thus viewed, the advantage enjoyed by the busi-
ness guest over the social visitor is minimal; it is of practical
importance only in those cases where there is no awareness by
the proprietor that there exists any condition that could be
dangerous to the unwary. It may be added that the dangerous
condition is regarded as known to the occupier if he once was
aware of it but has since forgotten.2 0 Here, again, the licensee
or social guest is entitled to the same warning as the business
patron. Now the interesting feature common to all the Lou-
isiana and California decisions mentioned above is that they in-
volved dangers of which the occupier had full knowledge and had
26. Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
27. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 398 (3d ed. 1964).
28. Id. at 385; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342 (1965).
29. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 389 (3d ed. 1964).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342, at 211 (1965).
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yet failed to warn." Hence recovery would have been justified
in each instance without the necessity of any change of doctrine.
The most recent of the Louisiana cases, Champagne v. Northern
Assur. Co.3 announcing the new rule is illustrative. Plaintiff
was injured while using a power saw at the invitation of de-
fendant, his father-in-law, at the latter's residence. Admittedly
defendant was present at the time of the accident and was aware
of danger from the device (which he had constructed himself),
and he knew that his son-in-law would not discover the partially
covered rotating saw blade. Even as a social guest under the or-
thodox common law rule he was entitled to a warning, which was
not forthcoming.
There remains, however, one important feature distinguish-
ing the duty owed the business guest from the duty owed the
social visitor: we have observed that the latter is not entitled to
expect that advance preparation has been made in anticipation
of his coming nor can he rely upon any inspection having been
made by the proprietor for his benefit. Hence he is expected to
be on guard for his own protection, and the proprietor, know-
ing this, need not warn him of any defect which a thoroughly
alert visitor or licensee would discover for himself. The business
guest, on the other hand, can rely upon the assumption that
some measure of protection for his reception has been taken;
hence he is not obliged to be on guard for his own safety. It
follows that when the distinction between business guest and
social guest is abandoned by a court, the effect may be a more
tolerant attitude toward any inadvertence with which the visitor
may be charged. However, issues concerning the plaintiff's own
self-protection are usually discussed as matters of contributory
negligence or assumption of risk. It is noteworthy that in the
Alexander decision (the first Louisiana case to break away from
the common law) the court, despite its venturesome announce-
ment of new policy, ended by denying recovery to defendant's
mother-in-law who had slipped on a rug while visiting. It found
that she had assumed the risk, since she must have been aware
of the danger from past knowledge of the condition of the
rug.
31. Alexander v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Co., 98 So.2d 730
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) ; Pampas v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 169 So.2d
200 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) ; Foggin v. General Guar. Ins. Co., 250 La. 347,
195 So.2d 636 (1967) ; Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561
(Sup. Ct. 1968).
32. 210 So.2d 68 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
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Business Guests or Patrons
The duty owed by the occupier of business premises to his
business customers rests upon the fact that the occupier is in
control of the premises which he has impliedly invited the cus-
tomer to enter. For this reason there is no duty to maintain in
safe condition the premises in the possession of other persons
which are merely adjacent to the occupier's premises or facilities.
For this reason the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit has
properly held that the Southern Bell Telephone Company could not
be subjected to liability for a dangerous condition of the front
porch of a store where the phone company had secured permis-
sion to install its telephone booth.3 3 The accident occurred when
plaintiff, a person proposing to use the telephone, leaned against
the post supporting the roof of the porch. The post was in dan-
gerous condition and the plantiff fell, injuring himself. The
liability would be that of the store owner, not the phone company.
One may profitably conjecture whether or not there might
have been liability in this case if the phone company had had
actual knowledge of the danger even though it could not have
been said that it existed on premises within their possession.
Contributory Negligence
Recently the Supreme Court imposed liability upon a youth-
ful lifeguard at a municipal pool and upon the public body itself
for failure to make reasonable efforts to rescue a fifteen-year-
old inexperienced swimmer.34 The negligence of the lifeguard is
beyond question. Had he been alert he would have discovered
the youth's predicament at the bottom of the pool in time to have
saved him. Even after the guard was expressly told by a com-
panion of the deceased's peril he refused to go to his assistance,
being apparently in a state of disbelief that is difficult to ap-
preciate.
There should be no obstacle to recovery in such case. The
defendants urged, however, that recovery on behalf of deceased
was precluded by the latter's contributory negligence; and the
carelessness of the fifteen-year-old deceased (who ventured into
deep water although he was unable to swim) was fairly clear.
The court, assuming that contributory fault of the drowned
patron would normally defeat a recovery, nevertheless avoided
33. Green v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 204 So.2d 648 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1967).
34. Williams v. City of Baton Rouge, 214 So.2d 138 (La. 1968).
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the effect of the boy's negligence by finding that the defendant
lifeguard had the last clear chance to save the victim. In order
to adopt this attack it was necessary to deal with the temporal
sequence between the time at which the patron became helpless
and the time when his danger was obvious to the lifeguard.
This writer suggests that the right to recovery in cases of
this kind should not be made to depend upon the fortuities of last
clear chance. Should contributory negligence ever operate as a
defense in a suit based upon the inattention of a professional
lifeguard? If the patrons of a public pool could aways be ex-
pected to shepherd their own welfare with the care of the my-
thical reasonable man there would be little basis for the universal
requirement of lifeguards at such places. The expectable risk
of heedlessness by patrons is the most prominent danger that
faces the proprietor of a pool. He therefore must undertake to
afford a safeguard against this very hazard and to watch over
those who get into danger irrespective of whether they are or
are not to blame for their own predicament. If the duty is to
protect the patron against the consequences of his own careless-
ness, it would seem highly inappropriate to allow the defendant
to set up that same carelessness as a bar to recovery. 35 There
is no policy whatever to support the defense of contributory
negligence in a case of this kind, and resort to the confusion of
last clear chance should be unnecessary.
TORTS-TRAFFIC CASES
William E. Craw ford*
In Monger v. McFarlain,l the court held the defendant's con-
duct to be negligent per se, but found no liability because the
negligence was passive, which, as two dissenting opinions point-
ed out, is contrary to the landmark case of Dixie Drive-it-Your-
self.2 A casenotel in the prior issue discusses the problem thor-
oughly.
35. Cf. Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La.
471, 137 So.2d 298 (1962) (duty to avoid obstructing highway exists to protect
against the risk that car approaching later might strike obstruction through driver's
failure to be alert; although the problem in this case centered on the issue of
proximate cause, the problem is basically the same where contributory negligence
is involved: Whenever the purpose of the defendant's duty is to protect against
the prospect of someone else's carelessness, that same carelessness should not be
asserted by defendant in order to defeat recovery.)
*Assistant Dean of the Law School; Associate Professor of Law.
1. 204 So.2d 86 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
2. Dixie Drive-it-Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471,
137 So.2d 298 (1962).
3. Note, 29 LA. L. REv. 167 (1968).
